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The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not
represent the views of the Department of Commerce, the United States Gov-
ernment or the American Bar Association.
I. INTRODUCTION
Last July, the National Institutes of Health (hereinafter NIH), a
United States government agency, announced that it was granting a
license to a pharmaceutical firm to make a generic form of the AIDS
drug AZT. The license was granted prior to and conditional upon
regulatory approval to market the drug as required by the Food and
Drug Administration.1 The decision by NIH was seen as an effort by
the United States government to address the AIDS epidemic by
widening the market for AZT and lowering its price by making it
available as a less expensive generic drug. According to published ac-
counts, a year's worth of AZT drug therapy can cost as much as $2800
as it is currently marketed. A generic AZT could reduce that cost by
forty percent, thus significantly lowering health costs associated with
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the deadly AIDS virus.2
The federal government's share of total U.S. spending on research
and development (hereinafter R&D) is awesome, significantly out-
pacing that of our major international competitors. In 1989, for ex-
ample, the U.S. government spent over $62 billion in R&D, both on
research conducted by contractors and grantees, and throughout the
network of 700 federal laboratories ranging from the Department of
Energy's Oak Ridge and Sandia Laboratories to NIH's National Can-
cer Institute; the Department of Commerce's National Institute of
Standards and Technology to the labyrinth of laboratories associated
with the Department of Defense.3 While much of federal R&D
spending is appropriated to military projects, significant basic tech-
nologies are being developed across the board in federal laboratories
and by federal contractors and grantees that have commercial
applications.
According to the General Accounting Office (hereinafter GAO),
twelve federal agencies funded over $16.2 billion for research and de-
velopment directly in their own laboratories in fiscal year 1990.4
These agencies are the principal patenting and licensing agencies in
the government. In the period between 1981-90, the agencies applied
for 15,669 patents based on research conducted in their laboratories,
and were issued 11,075 patents.5 During that time, these agencies
granted 1436 licenses, 455 of them exclusive to the private sector, and
thereby generated over $37.5 million in license income. 6
Increasing emphasis is being placed by policy-makers on building
United States international competitiveness through the creation and
exploitation of new technologies, 7 and some have been vocal in urg-
ing that more be done to make federal research and development
2. Id,
3. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 989 (1990) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
4. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: FEDERAL AGEN-
CIES PATENT LICENSING ACTIVTES 14 (1991). The twelve agencies are the Depart-
ments of: Agriculture; Commerce; Defense; Energy; Health and Human Services;
Interior; Transportation and Veterans Affairs; the Environmental Protection Agency;
the National Aeronautics Space Association; the National Science Foundation and the
Tennessee Valley Authority.
5. Id
6. Id, at 16. Over $30 million of this income is generated through licensing activi-
ties of the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), an agency of the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce. NTIS licenses patents for other federal agencies as a service.
For the period, $22.6 million in licensing revenue was received from two non-exclusive
licenses handled for the Public Health Service at the Department of Health and
Human Services regarding an AIDS test kit and hepatitis B vaccine licenses.
7. During remarks at the Presentation Ceremony for the National Medals of Sci-
ence and Technology, President Bush said: "If America is to maintain and strengthen
our competitive position, we must continue not only to create new technologies but
learn to more effectively translate those technologies into commercial products." 26
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DoC. 1807, 1808 (Nov. 13, 1990).
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more accessible to the private sector for commercial development.8
A view expressed within the United States business community is
that, while government should not decide what types of products
should be developed for the market, it makes sense for industry to
take advantage of the basic, pre-competitive research conducted in
federal laboratories.9
This article examines the legal authority of the federal government
to promote the commercialization of inventions made through gov-
ernment funding. The scope of this article is two-fold: first, to ex-
plore the legal authority of NIH, and other federal agencies, to patent
and license technology created in federal laboratories to the private
sector; and second, to shed light upon the government's authority to
permit its contractors and grantees to commercialize the inventions
they make in the course of their research, which is partially or
wholly funded by the government. This article will review the his-
torical background of the development of federal technology transfer
law, discuss its relevance and implementation, and finally, present its
recent arrival into the case law. Part II of this article presents a his-
torical background on the transfer of federally-funded research and
development. Part III discusses the changes in federal law that now
permit federal contractors and grantees to obtain title to inventions
they make in the course of federally-funded research. Part IV ex-
plains certain additional changes in federal law, which greatly facili-
tate the transfer of technology developed in federal laboratories.
Part V examines recent developments in federal technology transfer
case law. Part VI concludes with the remarks of the authors.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Federal Technology Transfer Policies from 1940 to 1980
Since World War II, the United States government has been the
single largest source of funding for research and development in this
country. As such, the technology transfer policies it follows have a
major effect upon the commercialization of the fruits of this R&D.
However, these policies, and particularly government policy toward
the ownership and commercialization of inventions created by private
contractors with Government funds, have been slow to adjust.
Before World War II, most government research and development
8. See Technology Transfer: Commercializing Inventions from the Federal Labo-
ratory, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (July 25, 1991) (opening statement of Rep. Ron Wyden).
9. Federal Labs, J. CoM., July 30, 1991, at 8A.
work was conducted in federal facilities by federal employees.10
Throughout that period, the general policy of the United States was
to make patents available for use by the entire population."
It was not until World War II that the complexities of technologi-
cal advancements required the government to increase its use of pri-
vate contractors in federal R&D projects. The government needed
the assistance of private companies, universities and non-profit orga-
nizations, especially in the fields of defense and medicine. 12 Table 1,
below, demonstrates both the overwhelming role that the govern-
ment plays in funding R&D in the United States and the steadily de-
creasing role that government laboratories alone have played in that
research from 1941 until 1988.13
GOVERNMENT SHARE OF FUNDING FOR ALL R&D IN THE U.S. 14
(Amounts of R&D shown in Millions of Dollars)
Total Government
Year R&D Funder R&D Percent R&D Performed Percent
1941 900 370 41.1 200 22.2
1945 1,520 1,070 70.4 430 28.3
1950 2,870 1,610 56.1 570 19.9
1955 6,279 3,510 55.9 905 14.1
1960 13,730 8,746 63.7 1,726 12.6
1965 20,439 13,040 63.8 3,093 15.1
1970 26,134 14,892 57.0 4,079 15.6
1975 35,213 18,109 51.4 5,354 15.2
1980 62,594 29,453 47.1 7,632 12.2
1985 107,757 51,668 47.9 12,945 12.0
1988 126,115 60,500 48.0 14,500 11.5
Table 1
Since World War II, the government has consistently been a massive
contributor to national R&D. In 1988, the government continued this
trend by accounting for approximately one half of all R&D funding
in the United States. At the same time, the performance of R&D in
government laboratories has declined relative to the overall conduct
of R&D. However, this relative decline should not obscure the fact
that, in recent years, R&D conducted in government laboratories has
10. The University and Small Business Patent Procedures Ac4 Hearings on § 414
Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 195
(1979) (testimony of Howard W. Bremer) [hereinafter "Hearings"].
11. Note, Effective Use of Government-Owned Rights to Inventions: Publication
Versus Patenting, 55 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1091 (1967).
12. See Hearings, supra note 10, at 196.
13. 1988 is the most recent year for which statistical data are available.
14. See FRITZ MACHLUP, THE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF KNOWLEDGE IN
THE UNITED STATES 145-207 (1962) (statistics for years 1941 through 1955) [hereinafter
MACHLUP]. See also STATISTICAL ABSTRACT (statistics for subsequent years)
[hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
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accounted for approximately 11.5% of all R&D conducted in
America.
The size of the government's direct conduct of research and devel-
opment, however, is dwarfed by the size, both relative and absolute,
of the government's support of private R&D efforts by industry, uni-
versities, independent research organizations and other entities that
receive government funds for R&D. As Table 2, below, demon-
strates, the government presently contributes well over forty percent
of all funding used in private sector R&D, or about $46 billion in re-
cent years.
PERCENTAGE OF PRIVATE RESEARCH FUNDED BY THE GOVERNMENT 1 5
(Amounts of R&D shown in Millions of Dollars)
Total Private R&D Funded
Year Private R&D by Government Percent
1941 700 170 24.3
1945 1,090 640 58.7
1950 2,300 1,040 45.2
1955 5,374 2,605 48.5
1960 12,004 7,020 58.5
1965 17,346 9,947 57.3
1970 22,055 10,813 49.0
1975 29,859 12,755 42.7
1980 54,962 21,821 39.7
1985 94,812 38,723 40.8
1988 111,615 46,000 41.2
Table 2
Throughout the post-war period and until relatively recently, how-
ever, the government had not promulgated any overriding policies to
encourage the use of this vast reservoir of government funded re-
search and development for the public good. There were no govern-
ment-wide policies to place the ownership of inventions made by
government contractors and grantees into the hands of those private
parties who might best use the technology to create something pro-
ductive for society. There was no established mechanism to license
government-owned inventions to the private sector for commerciali-
zation. As a result, the practices that controlled the granting of own-
15. See MACHLUP, supra note 14, at 145-206; STATISTICAL ABSTRACT supra note 14
(statistics for subsequent years). A detailed discussion of trends in Governmental
funding of R&D is also contained in MICHAEL RUBIN & MARY HUBER, THE
KNOWLEDGE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES 1960-1980 (1986).
ership of inventions to contractors and grantees were as varied as the
agencies themselves. For example, the Department of Defense had a
policy of obtaining royalty-free licenses to inventions and allowing
contractors to acquire exclusive commercial rights. In contrast, the
policy of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare was to
acquire full rights, title and interest to inventions that were devel-
oped under its research and development contracts. 16
Between World War II and 1980, the patent policies of several de-
partments were based on legislation. The Department of Energy pat-
ent policy was based on the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,17 which
restricted its ability to give title rights to inventions.' 8 The National
Aeronautics and Space Act of 195819 was the basis for the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) patent policy. This
legislation required NASA to take title to inventions unless it
granted a waiver to the contractor.20
Most federal agencies that used contractors for research and devel-
opment programs at some point acquired both licenses and titles to
patented inventions originated by contractors. "But the heart of the
controversies over patent policies [was] whether federal agencies
should follow the general policy of acquiring licenses or the general
policy of acquiring titles."21
In 1963, President Kennedy issued a memorandum to agency heads
in an attempt to create a semblance of uniformity in the federal pat-
ent system.22 The memorandum recognized the responsibility of the
federal government for the exploitation of inventions for public ben-
efit.23 This not only allowed the government to acquire principal
rights where the nature of the work or the past government invest-
ment favored full public access, but also recognized that the public
interest is sometimes best served by allowing exclusive rights to the
contractors responsible for the invention.24
The statement purported to establish a policy for all government
agencies with respect to inventions or discoveries made in the course
of work for or under contract to a government agency. The policy al-
16. FEDERAL COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, REPORT ON GOVERNMENT
PATENT POLICY 1 (Sept. 30, 1976).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2182 (1988).
18. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PATENT POLICY 17 (1987).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2457 (1988).
20. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PATENT POLICY 19 (1987).
21. Donald S. Watson, Research in Patent Policies in Federal Research and Devel-
opment Contracts, 21 FED. B. J. 146 (1961).
22. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Govern-
ment Patent Policy, October 10, 1963, 3 C.F.R. 861 (1959-63).
23. Id. at 861.
24. Id.
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lowed the government to acquire an exclusive or principal right in
four situations:
1) where the purpose of the contract was to create, develop
or improve products, processes or methods for commer-
cial use by the general public or which were to be re-
quired for such use by government regulations;
2) where the purpose of the contract was for research con-
cerning the public health or welfare;
3) where the research was in the field of science for technol-
ogy where the government has been the principal devel-
oper in the field; and
4) where the contractor operates a government-owned re-
search or production facility or coordinates and directs
the work of others.25
The contractor was permitted to retain principal rights in other sit-
uations. Where the purpose of the contract was to "build upon ex-
isting knowledge or technology to develop information, products,
processes, or methods for use by the government," and the contract
was "in a field of technology in which the contractor [had] acquired
technical competence" and a nongovernmental commercial position,
the principal rights were to be given to the contractor. 26
Contractors who assumed principal rights were required to report
to the government regarding the use made of the patent.27 If effec-
tive steps to bring the patent to the point of practical application
were not made within three years, the government had the right to
require the granting of a license to an applicant on a non-exclusive
royalty-free basis.28 The government also retained the right to re-
quire granting of the license royalty-free when in the public
interest.29
Finally, the statement required the Federal Council for Science
and Technology, in consultation with the Department of Justice, to
prepare an annual report on the policy.3 0 Later, a Patent Advisory
Council was established to provide guidelines for implementation of
the policy, to acquire data on the disposition of patent rights and to
25. Id. at 862-63.
26. Id. at 863.




prepare recommendations for the efficient exploitation of patents.31
The implementation of the Kennedy directive ultimately left to the
individual agencies the decision of whether to take title or license to
the patent, or award it to the inventor.3 2 Despite the directive, a
wide disparity in the application of patent policies within the federal
government continued.3 3
In 1971, President Nixon again addressed the problem of the frag-
mented patent system by issuing a revised Statement of Government
Patent Policy.34 Studies prepared after the Kennedy memorandum
indicated that a flexible policy of allocation of ownership rights was
important.35 Based on this finding, President Nixon revised the pol-
icy and granted agency heads more authority in the allocation of
principal rights to contractors.3 6 Where the government contribution
to an invention was small or where the invention was not a primary
object of the contract, equity principles were applied to give the con-
tractor principal rights to the invention.3 7 The revised policy also
provided additional guidance to agencies in promoting utilization of
government sponsored inventions.38
The actual effect of these revisions was minimal. There remained
no incentive for private sector institutions and universities to pursue
research with important private sector applications. As in the past,
commercialization of federally-owned technology was not a priority.
In Congressional hearings held well after the implementation of the
Nixon statement, one speaker testified that little change had oc-
curred in the federal patent system. He stated: "There is no real con-
sistency among the Agencies, or even within an Agency, or even
necessarily from one contract to the next within an Agency, as to
what the disposition of patent rights will be."39
B. Economic Problems with the Pre-1980 Policy Framework
Since World War II, the federal government has spent billions of
dollars on basic research and development. As previously noted, fed-
eral laboratories spent $16.2 billion at over 700 laboratories in fiscal
31. See President's Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agen-
cies, 7 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1209 (Aug. 30, 1971) [hereinafter "President's
Memorandum"].
32. Note, Fffective Use of Government-Owned Rights to Inventions: Publication
versus Patenting, 55 GEo. L.J. 1083, 1091 (1967).
33. Id.
34. See President's Memorandum, supra note 31; see also, Statement of Govern-
ment Patent Policy, 36 Fed. Reg. 16889 (1971).
35. See supra note 31.
36. Id
37. Statement of Government Patent Policy, 36 Fed. Reg. 16889-90 (1971).
38. Id.
39. See Hearings, supra note 10, at 198.
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year 1989 and currently employ a large percentage of the nation's
scientists and engineers.40 These laboratories develop new ideas and
act as a mammoth storehouse of institutional technical knowledge.
Much of this investment is made for the development of technology
for governmental purposes, including the areas of public health, de-
fense and space. In addition to fulfilling the needs of the govern-
ment, a great deal of technology is created, which, if appropriately
transferred, could be of great use in the private sector. For example,
by 1986, the work of government inventors had resulted in 28,000 pat-
ents, of which only five percent have been licensed for commercial
use.41 Although a great many of these patents were defense-related,
a significant number of unclassified inventions were never privatized.
Economists have long realized that innovation affects demand and
is thus one of the key forces that drives capitalism.42 A robust econ-
omy requires investment in research and development, as technologi-
cal change most often results in production shifts, which can form
the cornerstone of economic development and expansion. 43 Techno-
logical innovation, however, can only be economically meaningful
when it impacts the market. Therefore, a good idea which is never
commercialized simply remains only a good idea.
The absence of a federal technology transfer policy prior to 1980
resulted in an enormous investment of money in R&D, which yielded
a great deal of government-owned, but unlicensed, patents. Techno-
logical, bureaucratic, legal and communications problems, as well as a
lack of basic incentives, prevented the transfer of this technology to
American industry.44 However, changes in the global marketplace
and stronger international competition forced United States policy
makers to recognize that the government needed to take a more ag-
gressive stance in federal technology transfer.45 It was not enough to
fund, invent and patent inventions. The government had to actually
make its way into the market in order to produce positive economic
results.
The commercialization of federal technology is a complicated prob-
lem. Historically, there were no incentives for institutions or individ-
40. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. See generally S. REP. No. 283, 99th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 3442 (1986).
41. Id. at 3443.
42. EDWARD SHAPIRO, MACROECONOMIC ANALYsIs 231 (1970).
43. Id, at 231-35.
44. Id
45. H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 6460-64 (1980).
uals who performed government research to produce commercially
viable technology. A major stumbling block was the lack of a statu-
tory basis for royalty sharing.46 Without such explicit authority, it
was unlikely that inventors in the public sector would be motivated
by salary alone.
Technology transfer in the private sector model has also been diffi-
cult. However, profit-oriented management and goal structures exist
to motivate employees. Corporate inventors know that they are
guaranteed a royalty share in their inventions. From the perspective
of the acceleration of technology development, this is a significant ad-
vantage over the pre-existing federal technology transfer policies.
An economic parable states: "Lease a man a garden and in time he
will leave you a patch of sand. Make a man a full owner of a patch of
sand and he will grow there a garden on the sand."47 This parable
highlights one of the basic problems with federal patent policy and
technology transfer prior to 1980. There was no incentive for govern-
ment inventors or institutions to create commercially viable technol-
ogy48 because there was no legal basis to gain a piece of the resulting
monetary rewards. As a result, commercially viable technology was
not being created, and the wealth of federal inventions that were
available for licensing were not being transferred for use in the pri-
vate sector.
Policy makers came to realize that the technology transfer prob-
lem was creating a crisis in terms of U.S. productivity. As Congress
has stated:
The United States can no longer afford the luxury of isolating its government
laboratories from university and industry laboratories. Already endowed with
the best research institutions in the world, this country is increasingly chal-
lenged in its military and economic competitiveness. The national interest de-
mands that the Federal laboratories collaborate with universities and industry
to ensure continued advances in scientific knowledge and its translation into
useful technology. The Federal laboratories must be more responsive to na-
tional needs.4 9
As a result of this concern, Congress enacted a series of bipartisan in-
itiatives in the 1980s. These initiatives were aimed at revising gov-
ernment patent policy, reducing legal and bureaucratic barriers, and
creating incentives to improve federal technology transfer to the pri-
vate sector.
46. An exception, however, was the National Technical Information Service,
which, prior to 1980, was using its authority to share royalties resulting from inven-
tions of which it had custody.
47. GEORGE GILDER, THE SPIRIT OF ENTERPRISE 26 (1984).
48. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 953, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3457, 3460.
49. S. REP. No. 283, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3442, 3443.
[Vol. 19: 1, 1991] Federally Funded Research and Development
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
III. OWNERSHIP RIGHTS TO INVENTIONS MADE BY GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTORS AND GRANTEES
A The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and Related Policy Guidelines
The first of the bipartisan initiatives enacted by Congress to im-
prove the commercialization of government-funded research and de-
velopment was aimed at statutorily achieving a uniform, beneficial
policy on the ownership of inventions made by government contrac-
tors and grantees. The net effect of the changes in the law described
below has been the establishment of a statutory government policy
which normally places ownership of inventions made by government
contractors and grantees in the hands of those parties, thus promot-
ing commercialization.
The enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act5O (hereinafter Bayh-Dole) in
1980 established new, uniform guidelines for determining the owner-
ship of inventions made by government contractors and grantees
working on research and development projects funded in whole or in
part by the government. In short, recipients of government con-
tracts, grants and cooperative agreements for the performance of ex-
perimental, developmental or research work funded in whole or in
part by the federal government may now elect to retain title to any
subject invention made in the course of that work. The legal frame-
work that implements this general policy is set out in the Bayh-Dole
Act, as amended; a related Presidential policy statement;51 Executive
Order 12591;52 and government-wide implementing regulations.53 As
enacted, the Bayh-Dole Act made a disposition of rights only in those
cases where the contractor or grantee was a nonprofit organization or
small business firm. However, in 1983, President Reagan made the
decision to extend the policies set out in the Bayh-Dole Act to virtu-
ally all government contracts, grants and cooperative agreements. 54
50. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517 (amended by Pub. L. No. 97-256 at 35 U.S.C.
Ch. 18).
51. Memorandum on Government Patent Policy, 1983 PuB. PAPERS 248, 252 (Feb.
18, 1983).
52. Exec. Order No. 12591, 3 C.F.R. § 220 (1988), reprinted in 15 U.S.C. § 3710 app.
at 1374-75 (1988).
53. See 37 C.F.R. 401 (1990).
54. In the Memorandum to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies
dated February 18, 1983, President Reagan directed that:
To the extent permitted by law, agency policy with respect to the disposition
of any invention made in the performance of a federally-funded research and
development contract, grant or cooperative agreement award shall be the
same or substantially the same as applied to small business firms and non-
profit organizations ... under the Bayh-Dole Act.
The right of the government funding recipients to elect to retain
title to their inventions is limited in several significant ways by the
Bayh-Dole Act and its related policy statements. These limitations
may be divided into three groups as follows:
* The grantee or contractor must agree to certain statutory
conditions in order to qualify to make the election;
* In limited circumstances, the federal government may
make exceptions to the general policy and prevent the
grantee or contractor from taking title; and
* The government retains certain residual rights after a
grantee or contractor makes the election.
B. Contractual Limitations Required by the Bayh-Dole Act
The Bayh-Dole Act requires that each funding agreement for the
performance of experimental, developmental or research work
funded in whole or part by the federal government shall contain pro-
visions to effectuate the following:
* Various administrative requirements pertaining to: (1) the
disclosure of the invention to the government by the con-
tractor or grantee; (2) timing of the election by the con-
tractor or grantee; (3) requirements on deadlines for filing
domestic and foreign patents, and so on;55 and
* The disposition of royalties earned by contractors and
grantees from patents obtained by the Bayh-Dole Act in
accordance with that statute. Specifically, royalties must
be shared with the inventor and used for the support of
scientific research or education.56
Once these administrative requirements are met, contractors and
grantees may generally obtain title to inventions made in whole or in
part with government funds, limited only by certain conditions.
C. Exceptions to the General Bayh-Dole Policy
The Bayh-Dole Act allows recipients of federal funds to elect to re-
tain title to any subject invention made in the course of a contract,
grant or cooperative agreement for experimental, developmental or
research work funded in whole or in part by the federal government.
This policy is limited, however, by a provision which states that:
(A] funding agreement may provide otherwise (i) when the contractor is not
located in the United States or does not have a place of business located in the
United States or is subject to the control of a foreign government, (ii) in ex-
Memorandum on Government Patent Policy, 1983 PuB. PAPERS 248, 252 (Feb. 18,
1983).
55. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c) (1988).
56. I& § 202(c)(7)(B) and (C) (1988).
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ceptional circumstances when it is determined by the agency that restriction
or elimination of the right to retain title to any subject invention will better
promote the policy and objectives of this chapter .... 57
The Bayh-Dole Act requires that this provision be closely monitored
for abuse by the Secretary of Commerce and the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy.58
This provision of the Bayh-Dole Act forms a legal basis for the gov-
ernment to waive that Act in order to give preference to United
States firms in the commercialization of government-funded inven-
tions. This has become a matter of particular concern in recent
years, as new government-supported research programs have been in-
itiated with the objective of improving the competitive position of
United States industry in world markets.
Innovative uses of the government's authority to waive the Bayh-
Dole Act's requirements for the disposition of rights in federally-
funded inventions are now beginning to appear. The Advanced Tech-
nology Program currently being implemented by the National Insti-
tute of Standards and Technology of the Department of Commerce,
for example, has the objective of developing new advanced generic
technology and putting it into the hands of domestic firms for com-
mercialization. The implementing regulations for that program high-
light the ability of the program to limit foreign ownership in
technology developed with government funds.59 Only time will tell
whether this use of the waiver provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act will
prove to be an anomaly in government programs.
D. Residual Government Rights and Requirements
In addition to the contractual requirements that Bayh-Dole im-
poses, the government by statute must retain certain residual rights
to the invention, including a government-use license to practice the
invention, the right to limit exclusive licenses into which'the funding
recipient may wish to enter, and so-called "march-in" rights.
The government-use license that the Bayh-Dole Act imposes on
contractors and grantees must provide the federal government with,
at a minimum, "a nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up
license to practice or have practiced for or on behalf of the United
States any subject invention throughout the world."6 0 The statute
57. Id. § 202(a) (1988).
58. Id § 202(b) (1988).
59. 15 C.F.R. § 295.5(a) (1988).
60. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4) (1988).
also provides that the license may provide for such additional rights
in favor of the government as are determined to be necessary by the
government agency entering into grant, contract or cooperative
agreement.6 '
In addition to the government-use license, the Bayh-Dole Act also
places restrictions upon the ability of funding recipients to license
patents which they have obtained pursuant to the Act. The "Prefer-
ence for United States Industry" provision of the Act states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, no small business firms
or nonprofit organization which receives title to any subject invention and no
assignee of any such small business firm or nonprofit organization shall grant
to any person the exclusive right to use or sell any subject invention in the
United States unless such person agrees that any products embodying the sub-
ject invention or produced through the use of the subject invention will be
manufactured substantially in the United States.62
As previously noted, the provisions of this section have been ex-
tended to cover all grants, contracts and cooperative agreements en-
tered into by the government for the performance of research.63
However, the limitation above may be waived by the government if it
determines that "reasonable but unsuccessful efforts have been made
to grant licenses on similar terms to potential licensees that would be
likely to manufacture substantially in the United States or that
under the circumstances domestic manufacture is not commercially
feasible."64
Finally, the government retains so-called "march-in" rights to in-
ventions made with full or partial government funding. The govern-
ment is provided the right to "march-in" and retake title to
inventions in those cases where: (1) "action is necessary because the
contractor or assignee has not taken, or is not expected to take
within a reasonable time, effective steps to achieve practical applica-
tion of the subject invention;" 65 or (2) "action is necessary to alleviate
health or safety needs which are not reasonably satisfied" by the con-
tractor or grantee; 66 or (3) "action is necessary to meet requirements
for public use specified by Federal regulations and such requirements
are not reasonably satisfied" by the contractor or grantee; 67 or (4) the
contractor or grantee has granted an exclusive license in violation of
the "Preference for United States Industry."68
61. I&
62. Id § 204 (1988).
63. See supra note 49.
64. 35 U.S.C. § 204 (1988).
65. Id. § 203(1)(a) (1988).
66. 1d. § 203(1)(b).
67. Id. § 203(1)(c).
68. Id. § 203(1)(d).
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E. The Practical Implications of the Bayh-Dole Act
The practical effect of the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980
and its subsequent implementation in Executive Order and regula-
tion is that the government now takes title to virtually no inventions
created by government contractors and grantees. The inventory of
contractor and grantee inventions stockpiled by the government
grows no larger and indeed, slowly diminishes as patents in the ex-
isting inventory expire. This does not mean, however, that the over-
all government inventory of patents is shrinking. Inventions made
by federal employees are entering the inventory at an increasing
rate. The technology transfer challenge, which now faces the govern-
ment, is to license these government-created, government-owned
inventions.
IV. LICENSING OF INVENTIONS OWNED BY THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT
Government policy as enacted in the Bayh-Dole Act and its related
implementing statements leaves ownership of contractor and grantee
inventions in the hands of those parties. In theory, these inventions
are now being commercialized to the greatest extent possible by their
private sector owners. A second technology transfer challenge, how-
ever, is the commercialization of inventions created and owned by
the government.
A series of legislative actions over the last decade granted govern-
ment agencies clear authority to license government-owned inven-
tions to the private sector.69 These actions created financial
incentives for government agencies and employees to pursue vigor-
ously such licenses by permitting these groups to use any royalties
earned through their grant of licenses.70 The actions further estab-
lished a mechanism to facilitate government licensing of its inven-
tions by permitting federal agencies to use third parties, such as
other government agencies, to license their inventions.71 Moreover,
government agencies were permitted to enter into cooperative re-
search and development with the private sector and to make agree-
ments, before the work has begun, that give the private sector
participants commercialization rights to any resulting technology.72
69. 35 U.S.C. § 207 (1988).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 3710(c) (1988).
71. 35 U.S.C. § 207(a)(4) (1988) and 15 U.S.C. § 3710(c)(a)(4) (1988).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 3710(a) (1988).
Each of these new advances in the law is discussed below. The fol-
lowing section first describes the "baseline" situation: the legal mech-
anism which determines ownership rights to inventions made by
government employees.
A. Ownership Rights to Inventions Made by Federal Employees
The determination of government employee rights to inventicns
made in the course of their official duties follows government-wide
policies and procedures. These broad governmental policies are
found in three elements of law: (1) Executive Order 10096,
"[p]roviding for a uniform patent policy for the Government with re-
spect to inventions made by Government employees and for the ad-
ministration of such policy;" 73 (2) government-wide regulations
entitled "Uniform Patent Policy for Domestic Rights in Inventions
Made by Government Employees;" 74 and (3) section 8 of the Federal
Technology Transfer Act of 1986.75
Executive Order 10096 sets out the basic policy of the federal gov-
ernment concerning ownership of employee inventions:
The Government shall obtain the entire right, title and interest in and to all
inventions made by any Government employee (1) during working hours, or
(2) with a contribution by the Government of facilities, equipment, materials,
funds, or information, or of time or services of other Government employees
on official duty, or (3) which bear a direct relation to or are made in conse-
quence of the official duties of the inventor. 76
The Executive Order, however, contains exceptions to the overall
policy:
In any case where the contribution of the Government, as measured by any
one or more of the criteria set forth in paragraph (a) last above, to the inven-
tion is insufficient equitably to justify a requirement of assignment to the
Government of the entire right, title and interest to such invention, or in any
case where the Government has insufficient interest in an invention to obtain
entire right, title and interest therein.., the Government agency concerned
... shall leave title to such invention in the employee.7 7
The provisions of the Executive Order are supplemented by section 8
of the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, which provides that
if the government neither chooses to patent an employee's invention
nor intends to otherwise promote commercialization of the invention,
the employee must be granted title, subject to a governmental li-
cense. 78 The regulations found in the Code of Federal Regulations
. 73. Exec. Order No. 10096, 3 C.F.R. 292 (1949-1953), reprinted in 35 U.S.C. § 266
app. at 1285-86 (1988).
74. 37 C.F.R. § 501 (1990).
75. Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, § 8, 100 stat. 1785.
76. Exec. Order No. 10096, 3 C.F.RP 292 (1949-1953), reprinted in 35 U.S.C. § 266
app. at 1285-86 (1988).
77. Id.
78. 15 U.S.C. § 3710(d) (1988).
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provide the nuts and bolts operation of this policy.79 Each agency is
delegated the authority to make final determinations of employee
rights in inventions.80 The Department of Commerce is made the
government-side arbiter of employee appeals of adverse rulings.81
B. Licensing of Patents Owned by the Federal Government
Once the government obtains title to an invention made by a fed-
eral employee in accordance with the legal structure set out above,
the invention enters the government's inventory of inventions that
are available for licensing and commercialization. Under provisions
of the Bayh-Dole Act, government agencies have the authority to
enter into exclusive, partially exclusive and nonexclusive licenses
with private organizations to further the commercialization of pat-
ents which protect the inventions in the custody of the federal
government.8 2
There are several restrictions on the granting of licenses. The per-
son seeking a license must submit a detailed "plan for development
and/or marketing of the invention."83 This information is treated as
privileged and confidential and is not subject to disclosure.8 4 The li-
censee must then agree to use the invention "substantially in the
United States."8 5
Before an agency may grant an exclusive or partially exclusive li-
cense, notice must be published in the Federal Register and an op-
portunity for filing written objections must be granted s8 After this
period, the agency must conclude that:
1) the public interest will best be served by granting an ex-
clusive or partially exclusive license;8 7
2) the desired application of the license will not be achieved
by granting a non-exclusive license;8 8
3) the grant of an exclusive license is a necessary incentive
for the required investment risk;89 and
79. 37 C.F.R. § 501 (1990).
80. 1I § 501.4 (1990).
81. Id. § 501.8 (1990).
82. 35 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2) (1988).
83. Id. § 209(a) (1988).
84. Id. (referring to 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988)).
85. 1d. § 209(b) (1988).
86. Id § 209(c)(1). This is defined as a "notice and comment period."
87. Id. § 209 (c)(1)(A).
88. Id § 209(c)(1)(B).
89. Id. § 209(c)(1)(C).
4) the terms and scope of the exclusive license are no
broader than necessary to bring the invention to practical
application.90
The agency must also determine that the granting of a license will
not substantially decrease competition or concentrate the related
type of technology in a specific geographic area.91 In issuing licenses,
an agency must give first preference to small businesses with the re-
sources to apply the invention.92 Agencies are also given the author-
ity to grant exclusive or partially exclusive licenses in any invention
covered by a foreign patent application. Such a type of license also
requires a notice and comment period.93
Any grant of a license must contain certain terms and conditions.
Licensees are required to report on the utilization of the license,
while specifically referring to the plan originally submitted.94 The
agency must also retain the right to terminate the license in various
situations. For example, the license may be terminated if the licen-
see is not proceeding in accordance with the plan originally submit-
ted with the license request;9 5 if the licensee is violating an
agreement to use the invention substantially in the United States;9 6
or if the agency determines that termination of the license is neces-
sary to meet requirements for public use specified by federal regula-
tions issued after the date of the license and if such requirements are
not reasonably satisfied by the licensee.97 Before termination of a li-
cense, the federal agency must give written notice to the licensee of
its intention to modify or terminate the license. The licensee then
has thirty days to remedy the breach of the license or show cause
why the license should not be modified or terminated.9 8
Secretary of Commerce Robert Mosbacher, as authorized by the
Bayh-Dole Act, has promulgated government-wide regulations, cap-
tioned "Licensing of Government Owned Inventions," which imple-
ment this authority. 99 The regulations add that all domestic
exclusive and partially exclusive licenses shall be subject to the irrev-
ocable, royalty-free right of the government of the United States to
practice the invention and have the invention practiced on its behalf
and on behalf of any foreign government or international organiza-
90. Id § 209(c)(1)(D).
91. Id § 209(c)(2).
92. Id § 209(c)(3).
93. Id § 209(d).
94. Id § 209(f)(1).
95. Id § 209(f)(2).
96. Id. § 209(f)(3).
97. Id § 209(f)(4).
98. 37 C.F.R. § 404.10 (1990).
99. Id § 404 (1990).
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tion.l0 0 Furthermore, the federal agency shall reserve the right to
require the licensee to grant sublicenses in the interest of public
health and safety.'O'
The Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 extended the author-
ity to license patents to individual federal laboratories. With this de-
centralized authority, laboratories such as the National Institute of
Standards and Technology in the Department of Commerce are be-
ginning to license inventions made by their employees, using the pro-
cedures found in the Code of Federal Regulations.102
C. Incentives: Distribution of Royalties Received by Federal
Agencies
The legal structure established by Congress for the licensing of
government-owned inventions includes incentives for government
agencies and employees. Enacted as part of the Federal Technology
Transfer Act of 1986, these incentives provide government laborato-
ries and their employees a financial stake in the commercialization of
the inventions they create. Agencies are generally permitted to re-
tain and use all of the royalties that they earn in a given year from
the licensing of their inventions.103 The laboratories are required,
however, to share these royalties with their employee-inventors. 0 4
Government laboratories may retain all royalties they receive from
the licensing of inventions made by their employees, up to a maxi-
mum of five percent of the laboratory's budget for that year.105 The
laboratory must use the royalties it retains in certain ways specified
by law. First, "[t]he head of the agency or his designee shall pay at
least 15 percent of the royalties or other income the agency receives
on account of any invention to the inventor . . .if the inventor has
assigned his or her rights in the invention to the United States."'10 6
Second, from the remaining royalties it retains, the laboratory is per-
100. Id, § 404.7(a)(2)(i).
101. Id, § 404.7(a)(2)(ii).
102. Id § 404 (1990).
103. 15 U.S.C. § 3710c(a)(1) (1988).
104. Id § 3710c(a)(A)(i) (1988).
105. Id § 3710c(a)(2) (1988). The same section provides that if any royalties are re-
ceived by the laboratory in excess of 5 percent of its budget, "75 percent of such excess
shall be paid to the Treasury of the United States and the remaining 25 percent may
be used [by the laboratory]." Id
106. Id § 3710c(a)(A)(i) (1988). 15 U.S.C. § 3710c(a)(A)(ii) provides that the per-
centage paid to inventors may be increased by the agency through independent regula-
tions that provide for an alternate program.
mitted to pay for activities "that increase the licensing potential for
transfer of the technology of the Government-owned laboratories of
the agency," including education and training of employees consistent
with the R&D mission of the agencyo 7
D. Centralized Patent Licensing Activities for the Government
In an additional attempt to facilitate government licensing, federal
agencies are authorized to use other government agencies to license
their inventions. Section 207 of Title 35 of the United States Code,
enacted as part of the Bayh-Dole Act, allows federal agencies to
"transfer custody and administration, in whole or in part, to another
federal agency, of the right, title, or interest in any federally owned
invention."10s The same section authorizes the Secretary of Com-
merce to "assist Federal agency efforts to promote the licensing and
utilization of Government-owned inventions." 109
The Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 also addressed this
situation in amendments found in section 3710c(a)(4) of Title 15 of
the United States Code. This section controls the royalties received
by a federal agency as a result of "invention management services
performed for another Federal agency.""i 0 Such federal agencies
may retain royalties to the "extent required to offset the payment of
royalties to inventors .... the cost of foreign patenting and mainte-
nance for any invention of the other agency," and "for payment of
expenses incidental to the administration and licensing of inven-
tions.""' The remaining royalties must be transferred back to the
agency for which the services were performed.112
E. Cooperative Research and Development Agreements and the
Commercialization of Government Technology
The Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 authorizes federal
laboratories to make agreements with U.S. businesses concerning the
ownership and use of inventions created during joint research pro-
grams between the particular laboratory and business."l3 These ar-
rangements are made under so-called "cooperative research and
107. Id § 3710c(a)(B)(iv).'
108. 35 U.S.C. § 207(a)(4) (1988).
109. 1d. § 207(b)(1). In carrying out this authority, the Department of Commerce
operates a patent licensing program within the National Technical Information Ser-
vice, which licenses to the private sector government-owned inventions transferred to
it by other agencies, including the National Institute of Health, the Department of Ag-
riculture, and others. See 15 U.S.C. § 3710(d)(1).
110. I& § 3710c(a)(1) (1988).
111. Id. § 3710c(a)(4), § 3710c(a)(B)(i).
112. Id § 3710c(a)(4) (1988).
113. Id § 3710a.
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development agreements" or "CRDAs."114
Under these CRDAs, federal laboratories may accept "funds, per-
sonnel, services and property from collaborating parties."115
Although federal laboratories may not provide funding to collaborat-
ing parties, they may provide personnel, services and property." 6
They may grant to a collaborating party a license to an invention
made in whole or in part during the conduct of research under a
CRDA by a laboratory employee. However, they must "retain a
nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable paid up license to practice
the invention" on behalf of the federal government. 117 They also
may waive any right of ownership which the federal government may
have in any invention made solely by employees of collaborating par-
ties in the course of the performance of a CRDA.118 This waiver is
subject to retention by the federal government of an irrevocable right
to practice the invention. 119 Additionally, the agencies may permit
employees to participate in the commercialization of inventions they
made while working for the United States. 2 0
Laboratory directors are given some direction to guide their deci-
sions involving cooperative R&D agreements. They are required to
give special consideration to small business firms, and to give prefer-
ence to firms located in the United States.121 If a foreign company is
involved in a cooperative R&D program, the director must "take into
consideration whether [the] . . . foreign government permits United
States [entities] ... to enter into [CRDA] agreements."122
Contractor-operated laboratories have several requirements im-
posed upon them in addition to those placed on government-operated
laboratories. The contractor operating a laboratory for a particular
agency must submit a joint work statement to the agency.123 The
agency then has ninety days to "review and approve, request specific
modifications .... or disapprove" the statement. m  "No agreement
114. Id, § 3710a(1). This authority reaches to both government-owned, government-
operated laboratories ["GOGOs"] and to government-owned, contractor-operated labo-
ratories ["GOCOs"]. IM § 3710a(a), § 3710(a)(1).
115. Id, § 3710a(b)(1).
116. d, § 3710a(b)(1).
117. Id. § 3710a(b)(2).
118. Id, § 3710a(b)(3).
119. 1d § 3710a(b)(3).
120. Id. § 3710a(b)(5).
121. Id § 3710a(c)(4)(A) and (B).
122. I& § 3710a(c)(4)(B).
123. Id, § 3710a(c)(5)(c)(i).
124. 1&
may be entered into by a government-owned, contractor-operated
laboratory" before the joint work statement is approved.125 If the
agency disapproves the joint work statement, it must submit a "writ-
ten explanation of [the] disapproval or modification to the director of
the laboratory."' 2 6 Also, contractor-operated laboratories participat-
ing in CRDAs must prepare a model agreement for the laboratory in
order to "standardiz[e] practices and procedures, resolv[e] legal issues
and enabl[e] review" of the agreement to be carried out promptly.12 7
V. FEDERAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER CASE LAW
An important step forward in the development of federal technol-
ogy transfer law occurred when the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit decided Nutrition 21 v. United States v.
Thorne Research, Inc.,128 a case involving a claim of infringement
against a federally-licensed patent.129 The patent upon which the
claim of infringement was based had been filed by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture as a result of technology developed by its staff
regarding certain dietary supplements containing essential metal
picolinates. o30 The patent had been licensed for the U.S. government
through the National Technical Information Service, an agency of the
U.S. Department of Commerce.' 3 ' A pertinent provision of the li-
cense agreement provided as follows:
During the exclusive term of the Agreement, as provided
under Paragraph 2.1 above, LICENSEE is empowered pursu-
ant to the provisions of Chapter 29 of Title 35, United States
Code of other statutes
(a) to bring suit in its own name, at its own expense, and on
its own behalf for inkfringement of presumably valid
claims in a Licensed Patent;
(b) in any such suit, to enjoin infringement and to collect for
125. Id § 3710a(c)(5)(C)(i).
126. Id § 3710a(c)(5)(C)(ii).
127. I § 3710a(c)(5)(C)(iii).
128. Nutrition 21 v. United States, 930 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (on interlocutory
appeal from U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington State).
129. Nutrition 21 v. Thorne Research, Inc., 130 F.R.D. 671 (D. Wash. 1990).
130. U.S. Patent No. 4,315,927.
131. See 51 Fed. Reg. 31,163 (1986). Regulations governing the licensing of Govern-
ment-owned inventions are found at 37 C.F.R. § 404 (1986). Section 404.7(a)(1)(i) re-
quires that notice of an invention and the name of the prospective license be published
in the Federal Register in order to provide the opportunity for the filing of written
objections from the public within a 60-day period. No objections were filed in response
to the cited Federal Register notice. The National Technical Information Service
licenses patents for other agencies of the U.S. Government under authority of 35
U.S.C. 207(a)(4) (1984). See supra notes 6 and 99.
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its use, damages, profits, and awards of whatever nature
recoverable for such infringement; and
(c) to settle any claim or suit for infringement of the Li-
censed Patent.
provided, however, that NTIS [Department of Commerce]
and appropriate U.S. Government authorities shall have a
continuing right to intervene in such suit.l3 2
The terms of the license that granted Nutrition 21 the power to
bring suit in its own name for infringement were based upon an
agency interpretation of the statutory provision of the Federal Tech-
nology Transfer Act which allows agencies to grant patent licenses
"on such terms and conditions, including the grant to the licensee of
the right of enforcement.., as determined appropriate in the public
interest."133 The statutory language purported to fulfill the Congres-
sional interest "to minimize the costs of administering policies in this
area," and to promote the commercial exploitation of federally-devel-
oped technological research by giving especially exclusive licensees
all the rights traditionally associated with an exclusive license,
including the right of enforcement independent of the U.S.
government.134
The United States was surprisingly named as a defendant in Nutri-
tion 21's complaint as a matter of legal strategy.135 A motion for a
preliminary injunction to restrain further infringement accompanied
the complaint.
132. Nutrition 21 v. United States, No. 90-1382, slip op. at 7 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 29, 1991).
133. See 35 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2) (1988). NTIS interpreted the statute as empowering
federal agencies to grant to private parties an independent right of enforcement to fed-
erally licensed technology. See also Nutrition 21 v. United States, No. 90-1382, slip op.
at 12 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 29,1991).
The governing regulation, 37 C.F.R. § 404.6(a)(2)(iv), is essentially a restatement of
this statutory language. While Nutrition 21's license is by its terms primarily an "ex-
clusive" license, it is also "non-exclusive" with respect to compositions in which one
form of picolinate (zinc) is present. With respect to all other picolinates, the license is
exclusive for nine years, then reverts to non-exclusive status. See Nutrition 21 v.
United States, No. 90-1382, slip op. at 6-7 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 29, 1991). The distinction be-
tween picolinates and their relative status of exclusivity in the terms in the license
agreement is not relevant to this discussion, since this case only involved products in-
cluded in the exclusive grant.
134. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (1988) ("Policy and Objective" portion of the statute). See also
S. Rep. No. 662, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1984). 35 U.S.C. § 297 (a)(2) authorizes the
grant of enforcement rights, however, to "nonexclusive, exclusive or partially exclu-
sive licensees." 35 U.S.C. § 297(a)(2)(1988).
135. Brief for Appellee at 2. Nutrition 21 v. United States, CA FC No. 90-1382, Mar.
29, 1991.
Nutrition 21 justified the action of naming the United States as a
defendant in its brief to the Federal Circuit upon its concern that de-
fendant Thorne, Inc. would oppose the infringement action on proce-
dural grounds rather than on the merits.136 This concern centered
on the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Independent
Wireless Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America,137 which held,
under then-existing federal statutes, that a patent licensee could not
bring an infringement action solely in its own name, but had to do so
also in the name of the patent owner. 13s Since the patent owner had
declined to join the action voluntarily, the Supreme Court held
proper its joinder as an involuntary plaintiff. 3 9 This step was subse-
quently adopted in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,140 and is a
central consideration in patent and copyright infringement cases.
The second factor that influenced Nutrition 21's strategy was the
Department of Commerce's own regulations. The Department of
Commerce is statutorily responsible for establishing regulations gov-
erning the implementation of 35 U.S.C. § 207, which appear at 37
C.F.R. Part 404. Section 407(a)(2)(i) includes a reservation of rights
for the government in agreements with licensees. The United States
retains the right to practice the patent on its own behalf, or on behalf
of foreign governments or international organizations, or to require a
licensee to grant sublicenses when public health or safety so de-
mands.141 This reservation is usually intended to give the United
States "march-in" rights in the event that an important technology is
licensed and is not subsequently exploited by the licensee, such that
the public interest is adversely affected. Such a reservation, includ-
ing a "government use" right, could theoretically be considered
harmful to Nutrition 21's assertion of an independent right to en-
forcement when viewed from the perspective of traditional, non-gov-
ernmental commercial licensing law. As expressed in the case of
Goldhoft v. Morrhouse,142 the law had traditionally recognized three
types of patent licenses: exclusive licenses; partially exclusive
licenses and non-exclusive licenses.143 An exclusive license means
136. Id.
137. 269 U.S. 459 (1926).
138. Id, at 475.
139. Id.
140. See FED. R. CIv. P. 19(A).
141. See supra note 91. There is no statutory requirement that the government ob-
tain a royalty-free license on its own behalf from its exclusive and partially exclusive
licenses, when those licenses are granted under the authority of the Bayh-Dole Act
pertaining to the ownership of inventions made with government funding, found at
sections 202 through 204 of title 35 of the United States Code, which includes a re-
quirement that the government obtain a royalty-free use license to any invention cre-
ated in whole or part with government funding. 35 U.S.C. §§ 202-204 (1988).
142. 306 F. Supp. 533 (D. Minn. 1969).
143. Id, at 535.
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that the owner of the patent will not grant other licenses covering
the subject matter of the license and will not reserve for itself certain
rights. An exclusive license in traditional application is intended to
convey a complete power of enforcement to the licensee.144 Nutri-
tion 21's concern in maintaining its infringement action was that de-
fendant Thorne Research would be able to avoid liability for the
alleged infringement by asserting that Nutrition 21's license was, de-
spite its terms, a non-exclusive license. This non-exclusivity could be
based upon the government retention of limited rights and the idea
that jurisdiction would not be proper if the United States was not
joined as a party, notwithstanding the untested statutory and regula-
tory provisions to the contrary. 4 5
Nutrition 21 subsequently moved to make the United States a
party plaintiff in order to comply with the procedure outlined in In-
dependent Wireless.l48 The United States moved for an order to dis-
miss itself as a party, arguing that sovereign immunity had not been
waived, and that joinder as an involuntary party plaintiff would vio-
late 28 U.S.C. § 516, which grants the Attorney General the power to
conduct all litigation to which the United States is a party.147
The district court ordered the United States realigned as an invol-
untary plaintiff, finding that as the patent owner, the United States
was an indispensable party under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.148 However, recognizing the importance of the case as one of
first impression, the court immediately certified an interlocutory ap-
peal to the Federal Circuit for determination of the existence of a po-
tentially controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion, the answer to which may advance
the ultimate determination of an ongoing patent infringement litiga-
tion.149 The certified question before the court was whether Nutri-
tion 21, as an "exclusive" licensee of a patent owned by the federal
government, could, under the circumstances of the case, maintain a
suit without the United States as a party when the United States had
authorized Nutrition 21 to sue for infringement in its own name and
144. Id.
145. See supra notes 45, 117 and 118 and accompanying text.
146. Independent Wireless Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 269 U.S. 459,
468-69. The interlocutory appeal was certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Nutrition 21
v. United States, No. 90-1382, slip. op. at 1 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 29, 1991).
147. Nutrition 21, 130 F.R.D. at 672, 14 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1245.
148. Id.
149. Id
on its own behalf.15o
On appeal, Judge Rich, writing for the federal circuit, framed the
issue as whether the maintenance of an infringement action without
the government as a party was supported by statutory authority and
the explicit terms of the particular license. 15 ' The court found the
provision at 35 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2), which permits an agency to "grant
to the licensee the right of enforcement pursuant to the provisions of
chapter 29 of this title as determined appropriate in the public inter-
est," somewhat ambiguous in that the "right of enforcement" was un-
defined and did not explicitly address whether the right included the
ability to bring an infringement action without naming the govern-
ment as a co-party.152 Application of such a definition would cut di-
rectly against the venerable Independent Wireless decision.
However, that case could be distinguished because the case did not
involve a government-owned patent, and Congress had since changed
the law as applicable to federal technology licensing.
The Federal Circuit felt that little guidance was available within
the legislative history and governing regulations. The circuit con-
cluded, however, that public policy supported a statutory construc-
tion that allowed maintenance of an infringement suit without the
United States as a party.153 It based its conclusion on the overall
objectives of the statute,154 coupled with the government's own inter-
pretation of the statute as expressed in the terms of the license,
which granted an independent right of enforcement, and the need to
"minimize the costs of administering" policies in this area.15
150. Id.
151. Nutrition 21 v. United States, No. 90-1382, slip op. at 8 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 29, 1991).
152. Id. at 10-11.
153. Id. at 12.
154. Id.
155. The court stated:
Turnng to public policy concerns underlying passage of legislation that in-
cluded 35 U.S.C. 207(a)(2), we conclude that they support maintenance of this
infringement suit without the U.S. as a party. Congress passed Pub. L. No. 96-
517 in response to, inter alia, growing concerns regarding the effective private
sector commercialization of inventions resulting from government-financed
research .... We believe that these objectives, particularly the last one of cost
minimization - presumably to the taxpayers - would be undermined if the
U.S. as patent owner were required to make its limited litigation resources
available any time on of its licensees sought to sue for patent infringement.
The vigorous efforts of the Department of Justice not to be involved in this
case are eloquent evidence to that effect .... we defer to the Commerce De-
partment's interpretation of its authority.., we view the Commerce Depart-
ment's empowerment of Nutrition 21, pursuant to the plain terms of
paragraph 7.2 of the license agreement (quoted supra), to maintain this in-
fringement action without the participation of the U.S. as a reasonable inter-
pretation of the authority granted to federal agencies under 35 U.S.C.
207(a)(2)."
Nutrition 21 v. United States, No. 90-1382, slip op. at 10-12 (Fed Cir. Mar. 29, 1991) (em-
phasis added) (citations omitted).
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Given the increasing number of licensing agreements between the
United States and the private sector, the decision in Nutrition 21 is a
welcome relief to current licensees, potential licensees and govern-
ment lawyers alike. A different decision would have entangled the
federal bureaucracy so deeply into the management of licensed tech-
nology that the system quickly would have become unattractive. The
decision will embolden federal agencies to grant licensees a meaning-
ful independent right of enforcement and should go quite far in as-
suring the private sector that federally licensed technology can be
effectively protected from infringement.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the post World War II era, privatization of government-owned
technology was not an immediate concern. The United States was
preeminent in the global marketplace and therefore policy-makers
felt no sense of urgency to develop a legal framework to speed the
transfer of federally owned or funded technology to the private sec-
tor. This complacency was evident in the disjointed federal patent
system that existed through the 1960s and 1970s.
Increased economic competition and the new threat of strong for-
eign competition to the U.S. business community led analysts to look
more closely at the U.S. competitiveness problem. As technical inno-
vation, R&D investment and technology transfer each affect the
health of the nation's economy, Congress realized the need to take
the proactive role in streamlining the law to enhance the ability of
the government to transfer the technology developed in its labs and
through its funding to the private sector.
The evolving laws on technology transfer are reducing barriers to
the commercialization of the government's annual investment of tens
of billions of dollars for research and development. The Bayh-Dole
Act, the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 and the various
regulations and policy statements surrounding those statutes are the
keys that United States industry may use to unlock government tech-
nological developments and contribute to the improvement of our na-
tion's technological competitiveness. This legal framework provides
incentives, such as royalty sharing, to government scientists and
those working on projects backed with government funds to create
commercially viable technology. Opportunities exist for the private
sector to enter into cooperative research and development agree-
ments with government laboratories, and to commercialize directly
their own inventions made with full or partial government funding.
These laws have also made it easier for the government to license
federally owned technology to the private sector. The licensing of a
generic form of AZT, which was discussed in the beginning of this
Article, is one of many examples pointing to the benefit of federal
technology transfer. Recent changes in the case law further advance
that effort. For example, the decision in the Nutrition 21 case keeps
the government out of the management of licensed technology in the
hands of the private sector.
In sum, all of these elements are currently working toward the
goal of making government-owned technology more accessible to the
private sector. The effective use of these laws will enhance the com-
petitiveness of the United States, and through the creation of new
technologies and commercial products, help accomplish President
Bush's stated technology policy goal to ensure that the United States
will continue to be a strong force in technology development and in
the global marketplace.
